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Abstract
We examine the game theoretic properties of a model of crime first introduced
by Short, Brantingham, and D’Orsogna (Short et al. 2010) as the SBD Adversarial
Game. We identify the rationalizable strategies and one-shot equilibria under mul-
tiple equilibrium refinements. We further show that SBD’s main result about the
effectiveness of defecting-punishers in driving the system to evolve to the cooperative
equilibrium under an imitation dynamic does generalize to a best response dynamic,
although the nature of this strategy’s role differs significantly between the two dynam-
ics. The analysis reveals that the positive externality in punishing crime in the SBD
game converts the adversarial setting from a social dilemma to a coordination game.
We provide policy implications and lessons learned about the evolution of cooperation
more generally.
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1 Introduction
While various mechanisms can sustain cooperative behavior in social dilemmas, numerous
theoretical models, case studies, and experimental data have shown the punishment of defec-
tors to be particularly effective (e.g., Ostrom 1990; Ledyard 1995; Fehr and Ga¨chter 2000;
Henrich and Boyd 2001; Takahashi 2010; Boyd, Gintis, and Bowles 2010; Chaudhuri 2011).
Given that the punishment of defectors is itself a second order social dilemma, recent at-
tention has been given to how cooperative and punishing behaviors coevolve in evolutionary
settings (e.g., Hauert et al. 2007; Carpenter 2007; Levine and Pesendorfer 2007; Fehr and
Fischbacher 2004; Bowles and Gintis 2011). Most of these works examine the emergence
of cooperative and punishing behaviors in the standard social dilemma games, such as the
Prisoner’s Dilemma, Public Good Games, and Common Property Resource Games. The
lack of cooperation in these settings is driven by the tension between personal and collec-
tive interests: players maximize their personal interest which, in turn, has an indirect and
negative effect on the collective interest.
Games with a more direct adversarial structure have been largely ignored, yet an impor-
tant exception is analyzed by Short, Brantingham, and D’Orsogna (2010), hereafter SBD.
In their work, the authors introduce an evolutionary game in which two actors are selected
at random, one placed in a potential criminal role, the other placed in a potential victim role.
The former decides whether or not to steal from the latter, and the latter decides whether
or not to report this theft to authorities, if it takes place. A report may lead to the criminal
being convicted, thus affecting the expected net benefit of reporting a crime. The likelihood
for such a conviction to occur increases with the population’s overall proclivity to cooperate
with authorities and punish criminals. SBD modify the traditional cooperate and defect
strategies to account for punishing behavior, and then show that under a specific imitation
dynamic, the presence of a novel strategy type, dubbed the Informant, that both commits
crimes and cooperates with authorities, is highly influential in driving the system away from
the “Dystopian” state of high crime and toward the efficient, no-crime, “Utopian” steady
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state. Specifically, the presence of Informants is a sufficient, but not necessary, condition for
achieving the Utopian state.
The current paper more closely examines the game theoretic properties of the SBD Ad-
versarial Game. We consider the Adversarial Game worthy of study for multiple reasons.
On one hand, it provides an original depiction of an adversarial setting, but also presents a
simple formalization of the punishment of defectors (criminals) that explicitly captures the
positive externality in punishment present in many societies: civilians play a crucial role in
the self-regulation of pro-social norms (e.g., Sampson and Groves 1989; Skogan 1990; Bursik
and Grasmick 1993), but fear of retaliation may lead to disengagement from law enforcement
and the proliferation of criminal behavior (e.g., Gambetta 1988; Beittel 2009). Furthermore,
the SBD model uses a simple, stylized schema of strategy-types, including the novel Infor-
mant type, that is of independent interest. Finally, though the game’s design is directly
influenced by features of crime and punishment in disorganized societies, the model’s simple
structure has the potential to illuminate our understanding of the emergence of cooperative
behavior in a more general way.
In this paper we recast the SBD Adversarial Game in a classic game theoretic setting. A
specific goal is to assess the robustness of SBD’s main finding regarding the influential role
of Informants in the evolution of cooperation. From a broader perspective, we would like
to identify what the Adversarial Game can teach us about the evolution of cooperation. As
part of that goal we seek to identify exactly how the SBD game compares with other, more
commonly studied social dilemma games. We thus present both static and evolutionary
analyses. We first examine the one-shot Adversarial Game and fully characterize the set
of rationalizable strategies and (Bayesian) Nash Equilibria. As a bridge between the static
and evolutionary analyses, we then identify which equilibria survive two types of equilibrium
refinements: Evolutionary Stable Strategy and Trembling Hand Perfect Equilibrium. We
finally turn to evolutionary analysis. Whereas SBD assume a particular imitation dynamic,
we examine the evolutionary path of cooperative behavior under a simple best response
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dynamic.
Two main findings and two main lessons emerge from the analysis. Unlike other one-shot
social dilemma games in which the unique equilibrium is inefficient, the one-shot Adversarial
Game has multiple equilibria, one of which is efficient – Utopia. In effect, the specific form of
the positive externality in reporting (i.e., punishing) converts the second order public goods
problem into a second order coordination game, which in turn converts the overall game into
a non-standard coordination game. A key lesson is that an institution that converts the
second order public goods problem from a social dilemma into a coordination game can foster
crime-deterring punishment. We also show that SBD’s main result regarding the power of
Informants to foster a low-crime society generalizes to the case of best response dynamics,
though in a much different way than in the imitation dynamics of SBD. That is, we find the
availability of the Informant strategy to be a necessary, but insufficient, condition to maintain
a low-crime state, which will only occur given appropriate parameters and initial conditions.
This finding suggests a modification to SBD’s policy recommendation of converting defectors
into Informants to improve overall cooperation, under best response dynamics. Our analysis
identifies settings under which this policy is more likely or less likely to work.
We emphasize that this Adversarial Game does not manifest the second-order free-rider
problem in which the collective level of punishment on defectors is itself a type of public
good problem, as in Fehr and Ga¨chter (2000). Rather, the second-order punishment game
is a coordination game in which the expected net benefits of punishing are increasing in
the overall proportion of others that also punish. Thus, this Adversarial Game is closer in
spirit to social dilemma models, such as Ostrom, Walker, and Gardner (1992) and Boyd,
Gintis, and Bowles (2010), in which punishers must solve a coordination problem. Our
findings thus complement prior theoretical work by showing how coordinated punishments
can enforce cooperative behavior in a directly adversarial setting.
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2 The Adversarial Game
Consider a population of expected-payoff maximizing actors, i = 1, ..., N , where N is
large and even. Each actor has an endowment of 1 and must next choose a strategy
si ∈ {P,A, I, V }, where
P = “Paladin” = {not steal, report},
A = “Apathetic” = {not steal, not report},
I = “Informant” = {steal, report},
V = “Villain” = {steal, not report}.
After choosing their strategies, two of the actors, say i and j, are chosen at random (uni-
formly) and paired for an interaction. All other actors are bystanders. Each bystander
receives payoff 1 no matter what others do, yet as bystanders their strategies may affect the
payoffs for i and j.
The two selected actors, i and j, are randomly assigned (uniformly) into different roles:
one is assigned the first-mover role of “potential criminal,” and the other is assigned the
second-mover role of “potential victim.” Their strategies are then carried out in the following
way. If the first mover does not steal, then each keeps his or her initial endowment of 1
regardless of the second mover’s report strategy. If the first mover steals, then δ is taken
from the second mover, and αδ (with 0 < α < 1) is given to the first mover. Hence, an
amount (1− α) δ is destroyed (forgone productive activity by the first mover, etc.) in this
process, making theft socially inefficient. When the first mover steals, then the second
mover’s report-decision plays a role in determining the outcome. If no reporting occurs,
final payoffs are (1 + αδ, 1− δ) for the first and second mover, respectively. If reporting
occurs, the probability of a conviction is given by r ≡ (NP +NI)/N where Ns is the number
of actors that chose strategy s ∈ {P,A, I, V }. Notice that r, which we shall refer to as
the “report ratio”, is the proportion of actors that chose report as part of their strategy.
If conviction occurs, then the first mover returns δ to the victim and pays an additional
punishment cost θ, ending with a payoff of 1 + αδ − δ − θ. In this case, the victim is fully
reimbursed to receive payoff 1. If no conviction occurs, the criminal keeps 1 + αδ, and the
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victim pays an additional cost  (due to a loss in reputation or to retaliation) for a final
payoff of 1− δ− ε. Finally, we define s ≡ (NI +NV )/N , the proportion of actors that chose
steal as part of their strategy, as the “steal ratio”.
The Paladin, Apathetic, Informant, and Villain labels, which are taken directly from
SBD, are meant to convey the essence of the strategies. Paladins act as pure cooperators by
not stealing and reporting criminals; Apathetics disengage from society by neither stealing
nor reporting (first order cooperator, second order defector); Informants commit crimes but
also punish criminals (first order defector, second order cooperator), a strategy that plays a
strong role in SBD’s original analysis; and Villains act as pure defectors by both committing
and not reporting crimes. We emphasize that these labels do not necessarily match how
those terms are used in everyday discourse (if indeed they are used everyday). Rather, they
are meant to convey the essence of the four possible strategies in this Adversarial Game.
SBD’s original Adversarial Game differs from our version in a few ways, two of which are
worthy of note and relate to SBD’s primary motivation to examine evolutionary dynamics
of cooperative behavior in adversarial settings. The first difference is that our formulation
above is of a one-shot game, whereas their set-up is an evolutionary model with repeated
periods. Our one-shot game mimics their stage game in that in each period two actors are
selected at random and matched, and all other actors are bystanders for that period. The
one-shot game is of sufficient interest and, as we shall see, serves as a useful benchmark for
our later evolutionary analysis. The second difference is that strategies in SBD’s version are
either inherited or adopted via a pseudo-imitation dynamic (described in detail in Section 4 of
this paper) rather than being selected by payoff maximization (best responding). Strategy
revision via imitation is commonly assumed in evolutionary settings where the primary
interest is the evolution of behavior over time (see Sandholm 2010). We consider a best
response dynamic instead of an imitation dynamic because it is a dynamic more closely tied
to standard (non-evolutionary) game theoretic analysis and because, as will be shown, it will
generate different evolutionary paths of behavior.
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The Adversarial Game defined above is a simultaneous game of imperfect information,
but it could alternatively be defined as a sequential move game in which the potential
criminal makes the steal decision knowing his or her role, and the victim and bystanders
make their report decisions after observing a crime. The potential criminal would choose
from the strategy set {steal, not steal}, and the others would choose from the set {report,
not report}, thus decoupling the steal and report decisions from the overall strategy plan
as defined with the simultaneous structure. This sequential structure may more accurately
reflect the timing of real-life steal and report decisions; however, we use the simultaneous
structure for three reasons. First, having all actors make strategy decisions before knowing
their roles makes decisions salient for all actors rather than just those in the matched pair. If
bystanders make their report decisions knowing that they are bystanders, then their actions
have no relevance to their payoffs. Second, the simultaneous structure better reflects the
notion of societal conditions that partly motivates the model. Actors live in a societal setting
that has certain properties that pre-date and influence the effectiveness of criminal acts. The
committed behavior of all actors, including bystanders, reflects their latent support, or lack
thereof, for punishing criminals that is realized upon the commission of a crime. Third,
SBD assume that strategy-types are determined at the end of the prior period rather than
sequentially within each period. In choosing two-dimensional strategies at the start of the
period, we can, when moving to the dynamics, track the full evolution of strategy types,
which is a fundamental feature of SBD’s original analysis.
Unlike other social dilemma games, the one-shot Adversarial Game has a single potential
deviant. This feature better reflects the inherent asymmetry of criminal behavior, where
at a given point in time only one actor may be in a position to take advantage of others
or be victimized. The Adversarial Game also formalizes a stylized form of punishment for
deviators directly into the basic game by allowing the victim to immediately challenge deviant
behavior. Moreover, as with some types of actual criminal behavior, the victim has more to
gain than the bystanders when the criminal is punished because he or she is reimbursed. The
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victim also has even more to lose because an unsuccessful challenge results in an additional
private cost. However, the expected result of attempting to punish a deviant depends on
the larger societal characteristics, i.e., the behavior of the bystanders. Bystanders, though
not directly affected by the realized crime, do indirectly foster or inhibit deviant behavior
by influencing the likelihood of successful punishment. Thus, in a very simple way, the
Adversary Game captures the positive externalities inherent in the punishment of deviants.
The more supportive the environment, the larger the expected benefit of attempting to
punish, and the smaller the expected cost. We discuss the importance of this feature of the
model in more detail after our analysis of the one-shot game.
3 Static Analysis
3.1 Best-response Functions
An actor’s report decision is only relevant if he or she is a victimized second mover, which
occurs with probability ≈ s/N ; with probability ≈ (1− s)/N , this report decision is irrele-
vant. Conditional on the decision being relevant, the expected payoff for reporting is higher
than when not reporting if
r (1) + (1− r) (1− δ − ε) > 1− δ ⇒
r >
ε
ε+ δ
≡ R.
Hence, the best report decision is to report when r > R, not report when r < R, and either
report or not report when r = R.
An actor’s steal decision is only relevant if he or she is the first mover, which occurs with
probability 1/N ; otherwise, the steal decision is irrelevant. Conditional on the decision
being relevant and assuming large N , the expected payoff for stealing is higher than when
not stealing if
r [r (1 + αδ − δ − θ) + (1− r) (1 + αδ)] + (1− r) (1 + αδ) > 1⇒
r <
√
αδ
δ + θ
≡ S.
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Hence, the best steal decision is to steal when r < S, not steal when r > S, and either steal
or not steal when r = S.
Altogether, the actor’s ex ante best response function, assuming S 6= R, is thus
BRi (s, r) =

{P,A} , if s = 0 and r > S,
{P,A, I, V } , if s = 0 and r = S,
{I, V } , if s = 0 and r < S,
P, if s > 0 and r > S and r > R,
A, if s > 0 and S < r < R,
I, if s > 0 and R < r < S,
V, if s > 0 and r < S and r < R,
{P,A} , if s > 0 and S < r = R,
{P, I} , if s > 0 and R < r = S,
{A, V } , if s > 0 and r = S < R,
{I, V } , if s > 0 and r = R < S.
This function is depicted graphically in Figure 1.
3.2 Rationalizable Strategies
We use this best response function to obtain our first result.
Proposition 1 Fix δ, α, ε, and θ. Then, every pure strategy is rationalizable.
Proof. Consider strategy P . P is a best response to a conjecture that all others choose P ,
which is a best response for each actor to the conjecture that all others choose P , and so on.
An infinite chain of justification can thus be created in which each actor believes all others
choose P at each step, thus making P rationalizable.
Next consider strategy A. A is a best response to a conjecture that all others choose P ,
which we know is rationalizable from above. An infinite chain of justification can thus be
created for A.
Now consider strategy V . V is a best response to a conjecture that all others choose V ,
which is a best response for each actor to the conjecture that all others choose V , and so on.
An infinite chain of justification can thus be created in which each actor believes all others
choose V at each step, thus making V rationalizable.
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Figure 1: A graphical representation of the best response function BRi(s, r) under the three
cases: (a) s = 0, (b) s > 0, S > R, and (c) s > 0, R > S.
Finally consider strategy I. I is a best response if all others choose A, which we know
is rationalizable from above. An infinite chain of justification can thus be created for I.
As evident by this result, common knowledge of rationality does not alone restrict the
set of potentially observable behaviors.
3.3 Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium
The standard solution concept for (Bayesian) games in which the actors act simultaneously
not knowing the move by Nature is the Bayesian Nash Equilibrium (BNE) concept. Our
second result identifies the BNE of the Adversarial Game.
Proposition 2 Fix δ, α, ε, and θ.
(a) The set of pure Bayesian Nash Equilibria consists of:
(i) symmetric profile “Utopia”, in which each actor chooses P ;
(ii) symmetric profile “Dystopia”, in which each actor chooses V ;
(iii) any asymmetric “Semi-Utopia” profile, in which a fraction z of actors choose
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P , the remaining fraction (1− z) of actors choose A, and S ≤ z < 1;
(iv) and the asymmetric “Semi-Dystopia” profile, in which the fraction R of actors
choose I and the remaining fraction (1−R) of actors choose V .
(b) The sum of expected utilities is maximized in Utopia and Semi-Utopia.
Proof. (a) 1. We first show that the profiles listed are equilibria.
(a-i) Utopia with every actor choosing P implies (s = 0, r = 1). From the best response
function, we see that P is a best response to (s = 0, r = 1) for each actor. Hence, Utopia
is a pure, symmetric BNE.
(a-ii) Dystopia with every actor choosing V implies (s = 1, r = 0). From the best
response function, we see that V is a best response to (s = 1, r = 0) for each actor. Hence,
Dystopia is a pure, symmetric BNE.
(a-iii) Consider Semi-Utopia with S ≤ z < 1. It follows that (s = 0, r = z ≥ S). From
the best response function, we see that both P and A are best responses. With each actor
choosing a best response, it follows that Semi-Utopia is an asymmetric, pure BNE.
(a-iv) Consider Semi-Dystopia with the fraction R of players choosing I and the fraction
(1−R) of players choosing V , so that (s = 1, r = R). From the best response function,
each Informant and Villain is playing a pure best response. Hence, this Semi-Dystopia is
an asymmetric, pure BNE.
2. It is straightforward to show that for every other (s, r) combination, at least one
actor is strictly better off in expectation by changing strategy. The cases left to consider
are:
(i) (s = 0, r < S), where non-criminals are strictly better off in expectation by
stealing;
(ii) (s > 0, r > S), where criminals are strictly better off in expectation by not
stealing;
(iii) (s > 0, R < r ≤ S), where non-reporters are strictly better off in expectation
by reporting;
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(iv) (s > 0, 0 < r < R), where reporters are strictly better off in expectation not
reporting;
(v) (0 < s < 1, r = 0 or r = R < S), where non-criminals are strictly better off in
expectation by stealing.
(b) Social utility is lost anytime a crime occurs, and crime occurs in expectation if and
only if at least one actor selects a V or I strategy. Hence, Utopia and Semi-Utopia have
maximized sum of utilities.
The Utopia and Dystopia labels are taken from SBD, though the social configurations
they apply these labels to are slightly different. SBD use Utopia to refer to any state in
which no crime occurs, thus combining our definition of Utopia as well as our definition of
Semi-Utopia under one label. They refer to both Utopia and Semi-Utopia as Utopia because
the distinction was not important given their dynamic analysis. However, our analysis below
finds the distinction to be important. SBD use Dystopia to refer to the state in which no
reporting occurs, as we do here. However, the SBD Dystopian state includes both Villains
and Apathetics, while ours includes only Villains. There is no analogue of our Semi-Dystopia
in the SBD dynamics.
Two technical matters regarding Proposition 2(b) are of note. First, the sum of utilities is
maximized in any setting with no crime on the equilibrium path, so it is possible that the sum
of realized utilities can be maximized with some actors choosing I or V . This occurs when
none of those crime committing actors is selected to be the first mover. However, whenever
I or V are chosen by at least one actor and before roles are realized, there is a non-zero
probability that an inefficient outcome will occur. Second, if a fraction z of actors choose
P and the remaining fraction (1− z) choose A, then the sum of utilities will be maximized
with any z, 0 ≤ z ≤ 1. In effect, there are efficient, non-equilibrium Semi-Utopia strategy
profiles when 0 ≤ z < R.
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3.4 Equilibrium Refinements
As seen above, the Adversarial Game has multiple equilibria. Without any further assump-
tions about how strategies are selected, it is not clear which, if any, of the equilibria would be
chosen. One way to approach this equilibrium selection problem is to perform an evolution-
ary analysis. However, before turning to such analysis, we consider equilibrium refinements
in the one-shot game, which can identify which equilibria are most likely to be played and
thereby identify which equilibria we expect may arise in our evolutionary analysis.
Although we find many asymmetric Semi-Utopia to be equilibria in the one-shot game,
we do not find many asymmetric Semi-Dystopia equilibria. The reason for this result is
that the symmetric Utopia with all Paladins is a weak Bayesian Nash Equilibrium while the
symmetric Dystopia with all Villains is a strict Bayesian Nash Equilibrium. To see this,
observe that if all others are Paladins, then i is indifferent between being a Paladin and an
Apathetic, while if all others are Villains, then i’s unique best response is to be a Villain.
This fact has implications for refining the set of equilibria.
We consider here two refinements. The first is the notion of an Evolutionarily Stable
Strategy (ESS), which is a strategy that, if adopted by all actors, cannot be invaded by a
mutant (Sandholm 2010). Recognizing that the BNE of the Adversarial Game is effectively
a Nash Equilibrium, we here consider as an Evolutionarily Stable Strategy in this Bayesian
Game a strategy whose expected utilities satisfy the utility conditions for ESS. The second
refinement is Trembling Hand Perfect Equilibrium (THPE) in which no actor wants to
change his or her strategy given the small chance that others will deviate from their intended
strategies (Fudenberg and Levine 1996). As with ESS, we apply the THPE concept using
expected payoffs rather than realized payoffs.
Proposition 3 Fix δ, α, ε, and θ.
(a) V is the only pure Evolutionarily Stable Strategy.
(b) Dystopia and Utopia are the only pure Trembling Hand Perfect Equilibria.
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Proof. (a) Let Ui (x, y) be the expected payoff to actor i when he or she chooses x and all
other N−1 actors choose y. By definition, a pure ESS is a symmetric pure equilibria in which
all actors choose strategy x such that (i) Ui (x, x) ≥ Ui (y, x) and (ii) if Ui (x, x) = Ui (y, x)
then Ui (x, y) > Ui (y, y), for any strategy y 6= x. From Proposition 2(a), the only two
symmetric equilibria that may potentially be ESS are all choose V (Dystopia) and all choose
P (Utopia).
Consider Utopia. From the best response function it is evident that Ui (P, P ) = Ui (A,P )
but Ui (P,A) = Ui (A,A). Hence, P is not an ESS. Now consider Dystopia. From the
best response function, it is clear that Ui (V, V ) > Ui (y, V ) for y =∈ {P,A, I}. Hence, V
(Dystopia) is an ESS.
(b) A THPE is a Nash Equilibrium with certain properties, one of those being that
no weakly-dominated pure strategy can be played in a THPE. From Proposition 2(a), the
only equilibria to consider are Dystopia, Utopia, and Semi-Utopia. From the best response
function: V is the unique best response when all others choose V , so Dystopia is a THPE;
P is the unique best response when s is close to 0 and r is close to 1, so Utopia is a THPE;
but A is weakly dominated by P in Semi-Utopia, so Semi-Utopia is not a THPE.
That Dystopia withstands typical revisions follows from it being a strict equilibrium.
Conversely, all-Paladin Utopia cannot withstand invasions by Apathetics, but it can with-
stand small mutations or errors in which crime occurs.
3.5 Other Social Dilemma Games and the Reporting Externality
It is readily apparent from Propositions 1 and 2 that one fundamental difference between the
Adversarial Game and standard social dilemma games (Prisoners Dilemma, Public Good,
Common Property Resource) is that whereas a social dilemma game typically has a single
equilibrium that is inefficient, the Adversarial Game has multiple equilibria, one of which is
efficient. Indeed, upon closer inspection, though the Adversarial Game is a social dilemma
game in spirit and purpose, it is actually an N -actor, four-strategy coordination game with
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efficient Utopia and inefficient Dystopia as the two focal equilibria. The Adversarial Game is
transformed from a social dilemma into a non-standard coordination game via the reporting
externality which makes punishment (reporting) a best response when enough others also
punish (we refer to it as a non-standard coordination game because coordination is successful
on only two of the four strategies). The second order punishment problem is not a typical
social dilemma but rather a coordination game that has enough force to transform the first
order social dilemma, indeed, the entire game, into a coordination game.
It is instructive to revisit SBD’s interpretation of the model with this new insight in mind.
SBD explain that the reporting reflects a willingness to cooperate with authorities. That is,
the setting is one in which there already exists in place a third-party institutional framework
that can leverage society members’ willingness to cooperate into effective punishment of
criminal behavior. The larger lesson is that if such institutions can be developed, then
cooperation can be sustained even in short horizon interactions. This begs the question
of how such institutions can be developed in the first place; however, it is evident that
such institutions fundamentally change the incentives of potential criminals when there is
sufficient societal support.
In principle, any social dilemma game can be converted from a social dilemma to a mod-
ified coordination game through a similar mechanism. Consider the following example.
Suppose the Adversarial Game payoffs were replaced with a simultaneous move Prisoners
Dilemma Game payoffs and then appropriately modified. Also suppose that whether de-
fectors are reported and punished depends only on the choice of a single bystander, actor
3, whose actions represent society’s support or lack thereof for punishing defectors. The
bystander can choose the reporting ratio to be either r = 0 or r = 1, and his or her payoff
does not depend on this choice. The left matrix in Figure 2 depicts the typical Prisoners
Dilemma payoffs when the bystander does not report or punish defectors. The payoffs in
the right matrix correspond to when there is full reporting and punishment. The payoffs
are calculated by subtracting 3 from each defector and adding 2 to each victim; the defector
15
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C D
1
C 2,2,0 0,3,0
D 3,0,0 1,1,0*
(A) 3 chooses r = 0
2
C D
1
C 2,2,0* 0,2,0
D 0,2,0 0,0,0
(B) 3 chooses r = 1
Figure 2: Modified prisoner’s dilemma game.
pays back the 2 lost by the defection, which goes to the victim, and then pays an additional
1 as punishment.
In this modified Prisoners Dilemma Game, as with the Adversarial Game, we have de-
fection as the unique best response when there is no reporting, and we have cooperation as
the unique best response with full reporting. The two equilibria of Dystopia and Utopia
(denoted by * in the matrices) are the only two pure Nash Equilibria in the game. More
generally, if actors coordinate their reporting, then the incentives to defect will be overcome
by the threat of punishment. These two equilibria reveal it to be a game of coordination.
4 Evolutionary Analysis with Best Response Dynam-
ics
SBD’s main purpose is to examine the evolution of behavior with long-run repetition of the
Adversarial Game. They assume that strategies switch according to a special imitation
dynamic. Say that an actor is a “loser” in a period if that actor’s payoff is strictly less
than the initial endowment. Clearly, a first mover will only be a loser if he or she was an
Informant or Villain that was convicted after being reported against, while a second mover is
a loser if he or she is a victimized Apathetic or Villain or a victimized Paladin or Informant
that unsuccessfully challenged after being victimized. The “winner” is the other player in
that period. SBD assume that only losers switch strategies and that they do so by (possibly
imperfectly) mimicking one of the players in that round. The choice of which player to
mimic is made with a probability proportional to the players’ payoffs for that round. This
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probability implies a certain amount of inertia in the system. However, a caveat is that any
loser who chooses to mimic the second player always becomes a non-criminal type, directly
mimicking the second player’s reporting strategy only. The idea behind this is that the loser
in this case has decided not to mimic the criminal (which would certainly cause him or her to
become a criminal type), and has therefore implicitly decided not to commit criminal acts.
In short, the SBD dynamic is best described as a modified imitation dynamic with inertia.
SBD show that, with a deterministic version of their imitation dynamic, the Adversarial
Game always converges to either Utopia/Semi-Utopia or their form of Dystopia (consisting
of mostly Villains with some Apathetics, due to the imperfect mimicking), and that whether
the system converges to one or the other depends strongly on the presence of Informants in
the initial population. If there are no Informants in the initial population, then the system
converges to Dystopia unless a large fraction of the initial population are Paladins; if there
are any Informants, then the system converges to Utopia/Semi-Utopia. With a stochastic
imitation dynamic, the system converges to Utopia/Semi-Utopia with quickly increasing
probability as the initial number of Informants increases. In short, increasing the second
order cooperation (punishment of defectors) among defectors themselves has a powerful effect
on the system’s resting state, so much so that any number of initial Informants is sufficient
to eventually bring the system to Utopia.
It remains to be seen whether this striking result holds for other strategy revision dynam-
ics. We here consider the best response dynamic, which is an important alternative to the
imitation dynamic (Sandholm 2010). In an imitation dynamic, the actor adopts the strategy
of another actor, usually with the likelihood of adoption increasing in the performance of
the actor potentially copied. Inertia takes two forms: only one or a small number of actors
are allowed to switch strategies in a given round, and each of those potential switchers will
switch with probability less than 1. In a best response dynamic, the actor that switches
does so with more foresight: he or she switches to a strategy that is a best response to
the current strategies of the other actors. As with an imitation dynamic, a best response
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dynamic usually incorporates inertia, with only one or a few actors allowed to switch in a
given period.
There are many forms that a best response dynamic can take. Three main characteristics
are the level of inertia, how choice is made among competing best responses, and whether
decision errors are allowed during strategy switches. We consider a Best Response Dynamic,
denoted SBD-BRD, that selects on these three characteristics to maintain a closeness in spirit
to the SBD imitation dynamic. The intent is to find the closest best response dynamic analog
to the SBD imitation dynamic, thus allowing for the sharpest comparison of results when
switching the dynamic. We then consider an important variation on the dynamic to check
robustness.
Definition 1 SBD-BRD is the following switching protocol:
(a) At the end of period t, with probability q > 0 one of the two selected actors is chosen
to switch strategy.
(b) Conditional on being selected to switch, the actor switches to a best response to the
population strategy profile of period t, and if more than one best response exists then one is
selected at random (uniformly).
Note how SBD-BRD handles inertia, multiple best responses, and switching errors. It
intentionally mimics the degree of inertia in SBD’s imitation dynamic: there is a chance no
actor switches strategy; at most one actor switches strategy; and that actor is one of the two
matched actors. SBD’s assumption that the loser is the one to switch matches the spirit
of imitation dynamics because a loser would want to imitate a winner but not vice versa.
However, in the spirit of the best response dynamic, potentially any actor may see benefits
in switching, so we allow either of the two actors to be the one to switch. SBD’s imitation
dynamic does not have a natural analog to the issue of multiple best responses in the best
response dynamic, so without guidance from the SBD dynamic we here adopt a conventional
assumption that the actor mixes equally among best responses. SBD’s imitation dynamic
also does not include switching errors, and SBD-BRD makes a similar assumption.
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Proposition 4 Fix δ, α, ε, and θ. Under SBD-BRD, there are two possible long-term
behaviors:
(a) the system evolves to Dystopia, or
(b) the system maintains a level of reporting r & S > R.
Proof. Here, we assume that |R − S|  1/N , and define the following regimes of (s, r)
space, which cover all possible values:
(i) s > 0, r < R,
(ii) s = 0, r ≥ S,
(iii) s = 0, r < S,
(iv) s > 0, r ≥ R.
(a) First, consider the case S < R, with initial conditions in regime (i). Here, the best
response is to not report, so that each strategy update will either leave r unchanged or will
decrease r. There is a nonzero probability that these sequences of updates will also leave
s > 0. Conditional on s remaining nonzero, then, the system is guaranteed to eventually
evolve to a point in which r < S, in which case V is the unique best response, leading the
system to eventually reach Dystopia and stay there forever. If s becomes zero before this
can happen, the system switches to regime (ii).
Now, consider the case S < R with initial conditions in regime (ii). If r > S, either P or
A is a best response, so each update will keep s = 0 and may increase, decrease, or maintain
r. With probability 1, then, the system will eventually evolve through neutral drift to either
a point in regime (iii) or to the specific point s = 0, r = S. If r = S, all strategies are best
responses, so eventually an update will occur that either creates a criminal and puts the
system back in regime (i), maintains s = 0 and causes r > S (still in regime (ii)), or puts
the system into regime (iii). Hence, the eventual end result of beginning in regime (ii) is to
either enter regime (i) or regime (iii).
Let us consider, then, S < R with initial conditions in regime (iii). Here, the best
responses are V and I, so the next update will necessarily put the system into regime (i)
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above.
Next, consider the case S < R, with initial conditions in regime (iv). If r = R, either P
or A is a best response, so there is a nonzero probability that r decreases below R, leading
to regime (i). Otherwise, the unique best response is P , causing r to either increase or stay
the same each round, and causing s to decrease or stay the same each round. Eventually,
then, the system will evolve to a state in which s = 0, r > R > S, which is regime (ii).
Hence, when S < R, initial conditions in regimes (ii)-(iv) will all eventually (though
possibly indirectly) lead to regime (i), which leads to the absorbing Dystopia state with a
nonzero probability, and otherwise leads back to regime (ii). Therefore, when S < R the
system will eventually evolve into, and forever remain in, the Dystopian state, regardless of
initial conditions.
Finally, consider the case R < S with initial conditions in regime (i). The best response
here is V , causing the system to evolve to Dystopia with probability 1.
(b) Consider now R < S, with initial conditions in regime (iv). If r = R, both I and
V are best responses, so the system may evolve to regime (i) and, therefore, to Dystopia.
However, there is a nonzero chance that the system instead evolves such that r > R. With
r strictly greater than R, reporting is always the best response, so r will only increase or
maintain. Furthermore, if r < S, we are guaranteed to maintain s > 0, as I is the unique
best response. Therefore, the system will eventually evolve to a point with s > 0, r ≥ S.
At this point, P is certainly a possible best response (usually the unique best response), so
the system will eventually evolve into regime (ii).
Initial conditions in regime (ii) behave the same way when R < S as when R > S,
though this behavior may lead to entering different subsequent regimes, due to the switching
of the order of R and S. That is, initial conditions (ii) will eventually lead through neutral
drift either to regime (iv), specifically with S − 1
N
≤ r, or regime (iii), specifically with
S − 1
N
≤ r < S.
Now we turn to R < S with initial conditions in regime (iii). Here, the best response is I
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or V , so the next update will cause us to leave regime (iii) as s becomes nonzero. But, there
are three possibilities for how this will happen. First, if r ≥ R + 1
N
, this update will put us
into regime (iv). This is guaranteed to happen if we entered regime (iii) from regime (ii), as
mentioned above, and will specifically lead to regime (iv) with r ≥ S − 2
N
. If r < R − 1
N
,
this update will put us into regime (i), and lead to Dystopia. If R − 1
N
≤ r < R + 1
N
, the
system may evolve into either (iv) or (i).
We can therefore summarize these results in the following way. For R < S, if the system
is ever in a state in which r ≥ S − 2
N
, r is guaranteed never to fall out of that region again.
In this case, the system will maintain an r in this range while cycling between regimes (iv)
and (ii) (potentially with very brief stops in (iii) between). Furthermore, once this cycling
begins, there will never be more than 1 Villain in the system at a time, and never more
than SN + 1 Informants (the typical number will be much less than this). Finally, the
only initial conditions that are guaranteed to not lead to this long term behavior (and are
guaranteed to enter Dystopia) are those in regime (i) or those in the subset of regime (iii)
with r < R − 1
N
; essentially those initial conditions with r . R. All other initial conditions
are either guaranteed to end in this cycling (when r & R) or may lead to either this cycling
or to Dystopia (when r ≈ R).
The above argument is explored graphically in Figure 3. Here, we have plotted the mean
flow fields in (r, s) space for the two cases R > S and S > R, using N = 20. These mean
fields assume a uniform distribution on the initial number of players of each strategy. The
background colors range from light gray to bright orange, and represent the total amount of
time spent in each of the available cells, from very little to very much. For the case R > S
(left), we see that the trajectories are separated along the line r = R when s > 0, but that
the s = 0 line serves as a funnel from the region r > R to the region r < R. When r < R,
the trajectories inevitably lead to Dystopia, where they remain forever (hence the brightest
orange square on the figure). For the case S > R, we also see a separation around r = R, but
the line s = 0 no longer funnels trajectories from above this separation to below it. Here, we
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Figure 3: Mean flow fields in (r, s) space for the two cases R > S (left) and S > R (right),
using N = 20. Colors represent the total amount of time spent at a cell, ranging from light
gray (little time) to bright orange (much time), assuming a uniform initial distribution on
the number of players of each strategy type. For R > S, all trajectories eventually end in
Dystopia. For S > R, we have treated (r = S, s = 0) as an absorbing point (all trajectories
passing through that point actually cycle near it indefinitely), so that all trajectores end
either there or at Dystopia.
have treated (r = S, s = 0) as an absorbing point (hence the brightest orange on that plot),
because any trajectory passing through it will in fact never settle down to a single point,
and will forever cycle near that region.
Proposition 4 reveals that the SBD result about the influential role of Informants does
generalize in the case of SBD-BRD, as long as R < S, though the role that the Informants
play differs from SBD to best response. In SBD, Informants are a sufficient but not necessary
condition to drive the system to Utopia/Semi-Utopia. In SBD-BRD, on the other hand,
Informants are a necessary but not sufficient condition to keep the system near Utopia/Semi-
Utopia. This result is formalized in the following proposition, which considers a modified
form of SBD-BRD.
Proposition 5 Fix δ, α, ε, and θ. Under SBD-BRD, but with the strategy I now disallowed,
the system will always evolve to Dystopia in the long term.
Proof. With I disallowed, we must now reconsider our Best Response function BRi(s, r).
For all entries that list I as a non-unique best response, we may simply remove I. This
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leaves only the special case R < r < S, for which I is the unique best response. Note,
therefore, that if S < R, removing I from our possible list of strategies does not change the
Best Response function in any qualitative way, so that the result above – that if S < R the
system will always evolve to Dystopia – still holds. Also, note that if I is disallowed, the
inequality s ≤ 1−r must hold, since in this case s = V/N and r = P/N , and V = N−A−P .
If R < S, we must determine the new best response for R < r < S. Since r < S, V
is superior to A, and since R < r, P is superior to A. Hence, either V or P is the best
response, or both. The expected payoffs for P and V are
1− s
2
(1− r)(δ + ε) and 1− s
2
δ +
1
2
[
αδ − r2(δ + θ)] ,
respectively. These payoffs are equal when s = Q(r), with
Q(r) =
(δ + θ)(S2 − r2)
(δ + ε)(r −R) .
Thus, if s > Q(r), P is the best response, if s < Q(r), V is the best response, and if s = Q(r),
both P and V are the best response.
The function Q(r) is defined on s ∈ (R, S], is decreasing and concave up with slope
guaranteed to satisfy Q′(r) ≤ −2, and Q(S) = 0 while Q(s) diverges as r → R. Furthermore,
there is a critical value of r, call it r∗, where the curve s = Q(r) intersects the line s = 1− r
(the maximum value s can attain for any given r), and R < r∗ < S. Therefore, V is always
the unique best response if r < r∗ since in this case s cannot possibly be greater than Q(r).
We now introduce two new regimes for initial conditions, based upon Q(s):
(v) s > 0, r ≥ Q(s),
(vi) s > 0, r < Q(s).
Now, consider R < S with initial conditions in regime (v). If r = Q(s), the next update
may either remain in regime (v) with r > Q(s), put the system into regime (vi), or put the
system into regime (ii). For r > Q(s), P is the unique best response, so the system will
eventually evolve to a state in regime (ii).
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Consider R < S with initial conditions in regime (ii). Here, through neutral drift the
system will eventually evolve into one of three other regimes: regime (v), specifically with
s = 1
N
, r = S; regime (iii), specifically with S − 1
N
≤ r < S; or regime (vi), specifically with
s = 1
N
, r = S− 1
N
. To see this last possibility, it is important to remember that Q′(r) ≤ −2
and Q(S) = 0, so that the point specified certainly resides within regime (vi) and not regime
(v).
Consider next R < S with initial conditions in regime (iii). Here, the unique best response
is V , so the next step will bring the system out of this regime and into either regime (vi),
which is always a possibility, or regime (v), which is only a possibility if S − 1
2N
≤ r < S.
As above, this limitation on the possibility of bringing the system into regime (v) relies on
the facts that Q′(r) ≤ −2 and Q(S) = 0.
Finally, consider R < S with initial conditions in regime (vi). Here, V is the unique
best response, so each update that changes r or s is guaranteed to either decrease r while
increasing s (if a Paladin becomes a Villain) or maintain r while increasing s (if an Apathetic
becomes a Villain). If r ≥ r∗, then there is a nonzero probability that the system will undergo
a sufficient number of these latter updates to bring it back into regime (v). But, there is
also a nonzero probability that a sequence of updates occurs whereby the system remains in
regime (vi) and attains r < r∗. Below this point, regime (v) can never be re-entered, so the
system evolves to Dystopia.
Hence, if R < S and I is disallowed, all initial conditions will eventually bring the system
into regime (vi), which leads to Dystopia with a nonzero probability. Therefore, all initial
conditions are guaranteed to eventually evolve to Dystopia, where the system will then
remain forever.
5 Conclusion
SBD’s evolutionary game showed that Informants alone may drive a society from Dystopia
to Semi-Utopia. As a consequence, its primary policy implication is that recruiting In-
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formants from the general population may be an overall valid approach in helping reduce
crime. SBD’s result stems from the primary role Informants play in their imitation dynam-
ics, where Informants render Dystopia unstable to small perturbations. In SBD’s case, then,
Dystopia may be reached under a set of initial conditions containing no Informants, but any
infinitesimal deviation from this specific setup will drive the system to Semi-Utopia in the
long run. This is a universal result, in the sense that it holds across parameter space, as long
as Informants are present. It becomes natural then to ask what is the best way to recruit
Informants from the general population – and hasten the transition towards Semi-Utopia –
given specific costs associated with different player’s current strategies and histories. This
question is explored in Short, Pitcher, and D’Orsogna (2012).
Our current analysis presents a more nuanced picture: we find that under the best
response dynamics, the role Informants play depends on parameter choices, and that their
mere presence does not necessarily drive the system to Utopia as they did in SBD’s original
work. In particular, when S < R, Informants do not play a central role because the strategy
of committing crimes and reporting to authorities is never a best response. On the other
hand, when R < S, the Informant strategy plays a pivotal role in evolving the system toward,
and then maintaining, a level of reporting r & S, as long as the initial reporting level r0 & R.
Thus, the availability of I as a possible strategy is the only channel allowing the system to
reach and maintain a state very near Semi-Utopia, making Informants a necessary, but not
sufficient, criteria for the emergence of a low-crime state.
As discussed earlier, simply converting citizens to Informants in the context of best
response dynamics will not necessarily guarantee the system to evolve towards Utopia as it
did in SBD’s dynamics. Carefully choosing parameters, however, may allow the system to
make this transition; specifically, if parameters are chosen so that R < S. In terms of the
original model parameters, the R < S constraint implies that several conditions must be met
in order for the low-crime state to emerge. Let us first note that we may assume α, δ, and
ε to be fixed parameters intrinsic to the game between victim and victimizer, that cannot
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be adjusted by law enforcement. We may instead allow the degree of punishment θ to be a
variable parameter that authorities may fine tune at will. In terms of θ, then, the constraint
R < S implies that
θ <
δ
ε2
[
α(ε+ δ)2 − ε2] . (1)
In other words, the degree of punishment imparted on criminals must not be too onerous, so
as not to discourage the strategy I from being chosen. Hence, one policy implication of the
current work is that punishments should not be made too harsh, lest Semi-Utopia be made
unobtainable.
Furthermore, note that Eq. 1 can be made true only if α > ε2/(ε + δ)2. This implies,
though, that for a given α < 1, criminals may always choose a set of parameters δ and ε
that violates this second inequality, by choosing
 ≥ δ
√
α
1−√α, δ ≤ 1−
√
α ; (2)
the latter condition arises from the constraint that δ + ε ≤ 1. Thus, if retaliation against
witnesses is too large, the system has no chance of reaching a low-crime state, regardless
of θ. Of course, this raises another game theoretic challenge, this time for criminals: to
guarantee a crime-friendly society, criminals must restrain themselves to stealing no more
than δ = 1 − √α, but each criminal is individually motivated to choose a δ as large as
possible, i.e., 1. Hence, it seems plausible that only in societies where criminals themselves
are highly organized can such a situation arise, and if each criminal is acting purely in his own
best interest, the authorities should be able to arrange for punishment levels that promote
a Semi-Utopian state.
Of course, whether an imitation, best response, or some other dynamic best captures
actual decisional strategies is an empirical question. Are players perfectly rational and
capable of choosing a best response in each one-shot game, perhaps allowing for an initial
learning phase, or do they rather learn by imitation and by adaptation? It would thus be
interesting to verify in actual subjects whether players follow either of these two dynamics
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– best response or imitation – or some other decisional process when faced with the choice
of committing and reporting crimes. We leave this as future work.
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